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REFIK EMRE AYTIMUR

7, rue des Puits Clos apt. 13
31000 Toulouse FRANCE
Cell: +33 (0)609332022

Email: aytimure@yahoo.com
Web site: <http://sites.google.com/site/aytimure/>

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Political Economy, Public Economics, Microeconomic Theory

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Toulouse FRANCE, July 2010
(expected)

Dissertation Title: *Essays on Political Economy*

Main advisor: François Salanié

M.Sc., Economic Theory and Econometrics, TSE, 2005

B.A., Economics (*with honour degree*), Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2004

B.Sc., Mathematics (*with honour degree*), Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2004

WORKING PAPERS/WORK IN PROGRESS (details in page 3)

“Does Political Competition Eliminate Rents?” **JOB MARKET PAPER**

“Extremist Parties and Corruption”

“Lobbying a Single-Party Government versus Lobbying a Coalition Government and Lobbying a Legislature”

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Microeconomics 3 (Undergraduate), TSE, Spring 2009, Spring 2010

Teaching Fellow, Macroeconomics 3 (Undergraduate), TSE, Spring 2009

Teaching Fellow, Microeconomics 2 (Undergraduate), TSE, Fall 2009

Teaching Fellow, Microeconomics 1 (Undergraduate), TSE, Fall 2005, Fall 2008, Fall 2009

Teaching Fellow, Macroeconomics 1 (Undergraduate), TSE, Spring 2010

WORK EXPERIENCE

Lecturer, TSE, 2009 - 2010

Researcher and Teaching Assistant, TSE, 2008 - 2009

Auditing Internship, Deloitte & Touche, July 2003

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Graduate Fellowship, TSE, 2005 - 2008

French Government M.Sc. Scholarship, 2004 - 2005

Merit Scholarship, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2001 - 2004

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

European Public Choice Society Annual Meeting (Athens, 2009)
Scottish Economic Society Annual Conference (Perth, 2009)
Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet (Marseille, 2009)
Conference on Economic Design of the Society for Economic Design (Maastricht, 2009)
Seminar, University of Padua (Padua, 2009)

LANGUAGES

Fluent in English and French, native in Turkish

COMPUTER SKILLS: Mathematica, Scientific WorkPlace, Microsoft Office

CITIZENSHIP: TURKISH

REFERENCES

Professor François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 15
Email: francois.salanie@tse-fr.eu

Professor Jacques Crémer
Toulouse School of Economics
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 86 34
Email: jacques.cremer@tse-fr.eu

Professor Philippe De Donder
Toulouse School of Economics
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 42
Email: philippe.dedonder@tse-fr.eu

Professor Helmuth Cremer
Toulouse School of Economics
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 86 06
Email: helmuth.cremer@tse-fr.eu

REFIK EMRE AYTIMUR

Does political competition eliminate rents? (Job Market Paper)

An important objective of elections is to eliminate political parties' rents via political competition. However, electoral formulas differ and a crucial difference between two main electoral formulas is that the proportional representation system leads very often to coalition governments as opposed to the plurality rule system. Hence, we analyze the impact of coalition governments on political competition in order to capture a discriminating feature between these two electoral systems. In the context of coalition governments, we show that political parties earn positive rents due to the stochastic nature of the government formation procedure which softens political competition. Moreover, parties differentiate themselves in terms of policy preferences in order to earn more rents, since voters are ready to pay more rents with differentiated policy choices of parties. Since the plurality rule does not create such kind of uncertainty, we predict that it results in less political rents than the proportional representation system. Our prediction is confirmed empirically by Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005).

Extremist parties and corruption

We study rent-seeking behaviour of political parties in a proportional representation system, assuming that the final policy choice of the parliament is a weighted average of parties' policy positions, weights being their vote shares. We find that the parties' policy preferences and their rent levels are strongly linked. More clearly, our most interesting result is that the more a party is extremist, the higher her rent level. The intuition behind this result is quite clear: an extreme party has more policy influence than a moderate party since she pulls the final policy towards her position more than others. Hence, a voter is ready to pay more rents to an extreme party in exchange of a higher policy influence. Furthermore, note that the voter does not need to be an extremist to vote for an extreme party. He is acting strategically in order to influence the final policy in his advantage as much as possible. In turn, this strategic behaviour of voters let more extreme parties to earn higher rent levels.

Lobbying a single-party government versus lobbying a coalition government and lobbying a legislature

Lobbying a coalition government is different than lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. The more the interest group likes the status quo, the more likely that she is better off when facing a coalition government than when facing a single-party government. In addition, the case where the interest group is better off when facing a coalition government is more likely if the SIG's ideal policy point is far from the ideal policy point of the coalition government. Another result is that the final policy is not always efficient in the case of a coalition government.

Lobbying a legislature is similar to lobbying a coalition government. Although only a majority of votes are needed to pass a legislation, the interest group takes into account the preferences of all the three legislators, since the legislators other than the agenda-setter coordinate their actions via a transfer between them.